2023-07-04
来源：Review of Policy Research. （Jun2023, p1. 22p. 13 Illustrations, 1 Chart.）
DOI: 10.1111/ropr.12565（查看全文请关注文章末尾）
作者：张友浪（中国十大娱乐赌博城网址副教授）、翟文康（中国十大娱乐赌博城网址博士研究生）、李文钊（中国十大娱乐赌博城网址教授）
张友浪 | 中国十大娱乐赌博城网址副教授
李文钊 | 中国十大娱乐赌博城网址教授
论文简介
本文基于北京近年实施的 “接诉即办”改革，指出政策制定者越来越依赖“基于通过公众投诉系统收集的信息”的绩效排名制度，以提高基层政府的问责、透明度和响应度。通过分析基层政府是否根据其排名位置和受同一上级政府监管的同行数量(即管理跨度)来战略性地调整其响应度，进而对现有文献作贡献。
为检验提出的理论关系，本文构建了一个原始面板数据集，其中包含2019年2月至2020年12月期间北京333个基层政府的每月响应度信息、社会经济特征、以及领导力特征。实证结果一致表明，某月的高(低)排名和下月的基层政府响应度的下降(上升)有关。此外，随着管理跨度的扩大，排名位置对基层政府响应度变化的影响会减弱。本文还使用了一系列稳健性检验以验证理论关系。
英文摘要
Policy makers have increasingly relied on performance ranking regimes based on information collected through public complaint systems to improve grassroots governments'accountability, transparency, and responsiveness. This article contributes to the existing literature by examining whether grassroots governments strategically adjust their responsiveness according to their ranking positions and the number of their peers that are supervised by the same superior government (i.e., span of control).
To test the theorized relationships, we built an original panel dataset consisting of monthly responsiveness information and socioeconomic and leadership characteristics of 333 grassroots governments in Beijing, China from February 2019 to December 2020. Our empirical findings consistently show that having a high/low ranking is associated with a decrease/increase in grassroots governments' responsiveness in the next period.
Additionally, as the span of control increases, the effect of ranking position on responsiveness changes among grassroots governments weakens. A series of robustness checks were used to validate the theorized relationships.
